



Nancy Pelosi's Visit to Taiwan

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TUMUN VII





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Letter from the Crisis Director

Dear Delegates,

Greetings! Welcome to the committee on Nancy Pelosi's Visit to Taiwan. My name is Annie Rubinson, I'm a Tufts junior from Irvington, NY, majoring in International Relations. This is my sixth year participating in Model United Nations, and my third year as a Crisis Director in the Tufts University Model United Nations Conference. I could not be more excited to welcome you all to campus in just a few short months!

The future of Taiwan is one of the most hotly debated questions in global politics today. This is because any potential outcome will have grave national security implications for the United States, but nobody truly knows how quickly we ought to be preparing for such contingencies. When Nancy Pelosi made the controversial decision to visit the island last summer, setting off what is now known as the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, the imminence of this dilemma was brought to the fore of public attention.

As a student who has spent a considerable amount of time studying U.S.-China relations (as well as the Chinese language), I am especially looking forward to facilitating this committee. I will also note that although this is a historical committee, the events that we will be simulating could easily have unfolded in drastically different ways than they did in real life—so regardless of what decisions you choose to make in your roles, I can guarantee that our weekend will still be filled with lots of fun twists and turns (that being said, creativity is always encouraged).

The MUN conferences I attended as a delegate were some of the major highlights of my own high school years, and I hope to help create a similar experience for each of you at TUMUN VII. Please don't hesitate to email me with any questions you may have, committee-related or otherwise, especially if you are new to crisis or even a first-time MUN delegate. I look forward to meeting you all soon!

Best,

Annie Rubinson

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Introduction

Compared to other inputs like trade or security agreements, diplomatic visits may appear to be a relatively inconsequential component of maintaining a positive international relationship. However, every individual views the world from a completely different perspective, informed by vastly different historical and cultural experiences—and as a result, the intended or expected consequences of actions are oftentimes met with unexpected resistance. U.S.-China relations are the epitome of this concept.

In the debates leading up to Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, it was clear that many key decision-makers struggled to conceptualize China's strong reactions. However, had they better understood the history of Taiwan (as well as its overall strategic importance), it is possible that a cross-strait crisis could have been avoided. After gaining a better understanding of U.S.-China relations, specifically as they pertain to Taiwan, delegates will have the unique opportunity to correct these

various oversights, and perhaps even promote peace across the Taiwan Strait.

Statement of Issue



Figure 1 Map of Dutch Formosa colony (Taiwan) and surrounding countries. Wikimedia Commons.

History of Taiwan

The complex history of cross-strait relations dates all the way back to 1683, when the Chinese government first laid claims to Taiwan. The island was formally recognized as a Chinese province in 1885, and remained that way until 1895. This marked the end of the **First Sino-Japanese War**, which resulted in China being forced to cede Taiwan to Tokyo as a colony. Taiwan was strongly influenced by Japanese culture, politics, and language throughout the ensuing decades.



Everything changed in 1945, when Japan was defeated by the Allied Powers in World War II. The Allies pledged to return Taiwan to China as part of their post-War negotiations with Tokyo—but the island would not remain under their control for long.

In 1949, civil war in China (which had been ongoing since 1927) saw the defeat of the Chinese nationalists. Unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of the victorious **Chinese Communist Party (CCP)**, the incumbent **Kuomintang (KMT)** fled to Taiwan and re-established itself there. The CCP-led mainland thus became known as the **People's Republic of China (PRC)**, while Taiwan continued as the **Republic of China (ROC)** under KMT leadership—both governments not only refused to recognize the other but also vowed to regain full political control over both territories.

Ever since this initial separation, the Taiwanese government has become progressively democratic. One major turning point was the formation of the **Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)** in the 1980s, which put an end to the ROC's one-party governing system. This was concerning for the Chinese government as it meant they then were

forced to consider whether or not the Taiwanese public would be welcoming to the idea of reunification—not to mention DPP's relatively unfriendly approach to conducting mainland relations.

Taiwan's de-facto separation was only further facilitated by **Lee Teng-hui**, whose tenure as President of Taiwan was dedicated to expanding the island's diplomatic freedom. This primarily entailed allowing the dual recognition of both Taiwan and the PRC, entering international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and opening diplomatic offices around the world—all while adhering to and respecting China's "One China" principle (at least at first).

In the early 1990s, Lee began to float the possibility of more political equality with Beijing. He even went so far as to revoke his government's "declaration of a 'Communist rebellion' on the Chinese mainland, clearing the way for constitutional rule," much to the anger of Chinese President **Jiang**



Zemin¹. But even despite threats from the mainland, Lee only toughened his stance on political separation. This eventually culminated in the **Third Taiwan Strait Crisis** (a series of live-fire exercises and wargames conducted in close proximity to Taiwan, directly in advance of Lee's possible re-election)².




Figure 2 Map of PLA live fire exercises during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996. Between March 12-20, multiple exercises crossed the Median Line in the Taiwan Strait (Twitter).

Following this unprecedented show of force by the **People's Liberation Army (PLA)** in the Taiwan Strait, relations between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments were significantly compromised. This only worsened in 2000—when **Chen Shui-**

bian was elected as the first DPP President of Taiwan—and again in 2005 when China passed the “**Anti-Secession Law**” in retaliation to his separatist agenda. As Wang Zhaoguo famously described at the time, this legislation “provides that in the event the Taiwan independence forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”³

This marked a major deviation from the standing **Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA)**, which stated that “the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”⁴

¹ David E. Sanger, “Taiwan Announces a Democracy Step,” *New York Times*, May 20, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/20/world/taiwan-announces-a-democracy-step.html>.

² J. Michael Cole, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Forgotten Showdown Between China and America,” *National Interest*, March 10, 2017, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-third-taiwan-strait-crisis-the-forgotten-showdown-19742>.

³ Edward Cody, “China Sends Warning to Taiwan with Anti-Secession Law,” *Washington Post*, March 8, 2005, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/03/08/china-sends-warning-to-taiwan-with-anti-secession-law/5dcdfae8-4523-4350-9d45-77a85f6b240f/>.

⁴ “Taiwan Relations Act: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2479,” 1979.



In 2008, the KMT regained its power via the election of **Ma Ying-Jeou**. This signified the beginning of a more diplomatically moderate approach to cross-strait relations, marked by a series of diplomatic agreements that recognized Taiwan as a subcomponent in China (either overtly or implicitly). The Chinese government even managed to re-establish some control over the Taiwanese economy during this time, which greatly increased their confidence that reunification would one day be possible.

Unfortunately for the CCP, the Taiwanese public did not agree with these sentiments. Disappointed that Ma had seemingly sold out to the mainland, they responded in 2016 by electing **Tsai Ing-wen** of the DPP into power--and with conceptions of Taiwanese identity stronger than ever, not to mention an upsurge in political activity among youth groups, independence was not off the table. Cross-strait relations have only continued to erode since then, and the added complexities of U.S. involvement have only exacerbated these tensions.

Why China Cares

On the surface, it may appear as though “reunification” is nothing more than a vanity project for the CCP. However, to dismiss this rhetoric as a desperate ploy for stoking nationalism on the mainland--as many U.S. policy makers have historically done--would be a dangerous mischaracterization of why China cares about Taiwan.

Beyond garnering internal political support, the island of Taiwan is of great geostrategic importance to China. From a defense perspective, Taiwan is located only 100 miles from the mainland coast. Not only that, the island is positioned directly across from prosperous areas of China that are particularly difficult to defend. If a foreign agent were to gain full control over this territory--not to mention a potentially hostile government--China would lose a considerable degree of physical security.

Second, Taiwan also presents an opportunity for eradicating the U.S.’ forward presence in the Asia-Pacific, and ultimately expanding Chinese maritime influence. This is especially critical given the current state of China’s



military modernization, which as of today has allowed them to project power as far as the First Island Chain. Only by occupying the island of Taiwan would it be truly possible to extend this influence further, however, and ultimately gain the ability to govern the rules of acceptable behavior in the Western Pacific.⁵

Third, Taiwan has significant economic implications for China. For one, China is highly dependent on Taiwan's entire semiconductor supply chain, and likely will continue to be for the foreseeable future—this means that if China were to permanently lose control over Taiwan, highly consequential industries (namely in the automobile and technology sectors) would be at great risk of collapse.



Figure 3 The Taiwan Strait is a major hub for international shipping (Bloomberg).

Additionally, the area surrounding Taiwan is a major hub for international trade. In fact, President Biden's 2022 National Security Strategy even cited that 25 percent of global trade flows through the South China Sea⁶. Maintaining favorable conditions in Taiwan is thus a crucial element of China's survival, given the significance of global commerce to Chinese economic growth.

Finally, all of these challenges are only exacerbated the fact that China's productivity rates have continually declined since 2006—despite massive increases in government investment⁷. This has led to threats of social unrest within China, providing the government with conflicting incentives to either

⁵ This is paraphrased from John J. Mearsheimer's "Can China Rise Peacefully?" *National Interest*, October 25, 2014, <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204>.

⁶ "National Security Strategy," The White House, October 12, 2022, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf)

[content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf).

⁷ Michael Beckley, "The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017), 112, Figure 2.



preserve the national economy by maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, or make a power grab on the island in attempts to compensate for political criticism.

In short, failing to deliver on its promise to re-establish control over Taiwan would have significant consequences for the stability of **Xi Jinping's** regime, not to mention the Chinese government overall—after all, an independent Taiwan would demonstrate that it is possible for Chinese people to achieve prosperity under democracy, something which the CCP has attempted to conceal for decades. However, internal political dynamics are still far from the only drivers of Chinese foreign policy regarding Taiwan, and failure to weigh them is precisely what led to the dangerous consequences that followed Nancy Pelosi's visit.

U.S. Foreign Policy

While Taiwan has grown increasingly separate from Beijing, the

island has not been recognized as an independent state—nor do they necessarily want to be, according to the latest opinion polls⁸. This is a position which even the United States has adhered to, despite their ongoing support for the promotion of democracy worldwide.

Officially, the United States' Taiwan policy is dictated by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The TRA is designed to promote the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, in a way that promotes “extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations” with Taiwan, while remaining within the parameters of Beijing's “One China” policy⁹.



Figure 4 President Jimmy Carter announces the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 (American Enterprise Institute)

Under the TRA, the United States may “maintain the capacity to defend”

⁸ “Has independence gone mainstream in Taiwan?” Economist Intelligence, October 29, 2021, <http://country.eiu.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/article.aspx?articleid=1841548967>.

⁹ The “One China” policy recognizes the CCP as the sole governing body of China, including Taiwan; Taiwan Relations Act.



Taiwan, even by means of conducting arms sales. However, nowhere in the Act does it state that the United States and Taiwan have any type of formal diplomatic, let alone strategic relationship--and thus, the United States has no formal obligation to defend the island in the event of a conflict. This loophole was intentionally designed by Washington, in attempts to appease both Taipei and Beijing at the same time.

For decades, strategic ambiguity has allowed the United States to maintain beneficial relations with two diametrically opposing agents, all while reassuring strategic allies and preventing Great Power War. However, this peace has never been entirely stable. This is because uncertainty lies at the root of almost every international dispute, something which is inevitably (and considerably) amplified by policies as vague as the TRA. Such was famously made evident in 1995, when Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui decided to speak at a Cornell University graduate's reunion.

Because Lee's trip was to take place in an entirely private capacity, the United States Congress pressured President Bill Clinton to grant him a travel visa. From the American point of view, this would have no implications on the U.S.' official stance on the status of Taiwan--China, however, was appalled by Washington's decision to permit a visit by a Taiwanese head of state, regardless of the context. The CCP even retaliated by canceling a series of meetings, and one official news agency stated that "the issue of Taiwan is as explosive as a barrel of gunpowder. It is extremely dangerous to warm it up."¹⁰

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis began just one month after Lee departed the United States, in protest of his upcoming re-election following this controversial decision. The exercises conducted marked a significant escalation in cross-strait relations, and came off as a drastic overreaction to most observers--China, on the other hand, framed it as a necessary measure to protect their national security. This is because Lee's speech at Cornell set two

¹⁰ David W. Chen, "Taiwan's President Tiptoes Around Politics at Cornell," *New York Times*, June 10, 1995,

<https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/10/world/taiwan-s-president-tiptoes-around-politics-at-cornell.html>.



key precedents that were unfavorable to China's national security goals.

First, the CCP worried that Lee's travel permit might have opened up the door for official visits between Washington and the United States. American politicians (albeit not Clinton) had already begun to float this idea, with one representative even stating publicly that "the Taiwan genie is out of the bottle."¹¹ If taken, such a step would disintegrate the integrity of the Taiwan Relations Act, and thus, the "One China" principle as a whole.

Second, the CCP also worried about the potential implications of Cornell on the future of Taiwan's relationship with Japan. Namely, the PRC feared that Lee might invoke the same rationale as an excuse to visit Kyoto University in Japan--from which he also held a degree--leading them down the same slippery slope as in the case of the United States.¹²

It is highly plausible that the Chinese government did not feel genuinely threatened by Lee's visit to Cornell, and that the incident was merely

exploited as part of an excuse to expand PLA influence in the Taiwan Strait.

Nevertheless, such behavior is largely unavoidable under a vague policy such as the Taiwan Relations Act, and writing it off as irrational will be far from sufficient to discourage it.



Figure 5 President of Taiwan Lee Teng-hui speaks at Cornell University in 1995 (Cornell Chronicle).

Sino-Pelosi Relations

Unlike Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell, Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was highly politically charged. This is because not only was Pelosi the highest ranking U.S. official to do so since Newt Gingrich in 1997, she is also well-known as one of the most outspoken critics of the PRC--including by the Chinese government itself. Such has been made

¹¹ Daniel Southerl, "First Private Visit to U.S. Completed, Taiwan President Mulls Trip to Alaska," *Washington Post*, June 11, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/11/>

[first-private-visit-to-us-completed-taiwan-president-mulls-trip-to-alaska/223c4093-18cd-4a34-be95-d5f9ef3ae2b3/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/11/first-private-visit-to-us-completed-taiwan-president-mulls-trip-to-alaska/223c4093-18cd-4a34-be95-d5f9ef3ae2b3/).

¹² *Ibid.*



abundantly evident throughout the entirety of her political career.¹³

In 1991, Pelosi participated in a silent protest at the site of the **Tiananmen Square massacre**, alongside two fellow congresspeople. This was met with harsh criticism from the Chinese government, to such a large extent that the then-U.S. Ambassador to China berated Pelosi for her actions.

Two years later, Pelosi attempted to sanction China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status in the WTO, citing abusive labor practices. She doubled down on this several years later, calling for the withdrawal of the United States from the Organization in the event that China's application for membership was approved. Both of these measures failed, but hardly went unnoticed.

Third, Pelosi has consistently been a vocal advocate for better human rights protections in China. Not only has she helped pass multiple pieces of legislation that sanctioned China officials (and trade practices) tied to human rights abuses— and also called for the diplomatic boycott of Olympic

Games hosted in China—Pelosi even attempted to personally confront then-Vice President **Hu Jintao** while he when he visited the United States in 2002— specifically, she reportedly handed him four letters from Congress urging him to “acknowledge China's role in human rights violations.” All of the letters were refused.¹⁴

In short, Nancy Pelosi had little to no plausible deniability about her intentions when she announced her decision to visit Taiwan. Not only was she planning on landing in the capital city for explicitly political purposes— unlike Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s—she also had a long history of speaking out against the Chinese Communist Party. But even if Pelosi's passionate stance on cross-strait relations is purely a reflection of her own individual beliefs, her actions in Taipei were nevertheless interpreted by Beijing as representative of the entire United States government— as such, the ensuing consequences were severe.

¹³ Marianna Sotomayor, “Pelosi's Taiwan trip a culmination of decades of challenging China,” *Washington Post*, August 2, 2022,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/08/02/pelosis-taiwan-trip-culmination-decades-challenging-china/>.

¹⁴ Sotomayor, “Pelosi's Taiwan trip.”



Figure 6 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi peacefully protests the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, China (CNN).

Current Situation

It is July 2022, and the Chinese military has been demonstrating an increasing willingness to expand their military activities near Taiwan. Despite this, however, Nancy Pelosi has announced that she wishes to lead a congressional delegation to the island. If approved by the committee, this will make her the highest ranking U.S. official to take such a trip in 25 years.

The Chinese Communist Party has expressed strong disapproval of Speaker Pelosi's potential visit to Taiwan. One Foreign Ministry Spokesperson has even gone so far as to say, "the People's Liberation Army will never sit idly by, and China will take resolute responses and strong

countermeasures to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity... As for what measures, if she [Pelosi] dares to go, we'll have to wait and see."¹⁵ This reaction was likely amplified by recent public slip-ups by President Biden, in which he over exaggerated the extent of U.S. commitments to Taiwan—something which the CCP has taken at face value.¹⁶

The members of this committee have been called together to discuss whether or not this is truly the best course of action for protecting the U.S.' strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific, as well as prepare for the possibility of escalation. The American public is sharply divided on this issue, with some expressing concern at the prospect of Chinese retaliation, while others insist that the U.S. cannot cower in the face of its greatest competitor.

In our committee sessions, we will be discussing both the planning and the aftermath of Pelosi's visit (or lack thereof). The distribution of this time will depend on whether the committee leans toward or against allowing such a

¹⁵ Peter Baker, "U.S. Warns China Not to Turn Pelosi's Expected Trip into a 'Crisis.'" *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/01/us/politics/taiwan-pelosi.html>.

¹⁶ Zack Cooper, "The Fourth Taiwan Strait Slip-Up," *The American Enterprise Institute*, September 19, 2022, <https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-slip-up/>.



trip to happen. To prepare, please be sure to review all of the questions below. Feel free to email me with questions concerning the content of this background guide.



Figure 7 Pro-China protestor steps on a poster of Nancy Pelosi in Hong Kong (Foreign Policy).

this to China, Taiwan, allies, and the American public?

- What strategies might the committee employ to garner public support for their decisions?
- In anticipation of (or in the event of) a contingency on the Taiwan Strait, what measures might the U.S. take to reassure its allies and strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region?

Questions to Consider

- How might a visit by Pelosi to Taiwan help and/or harm U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific?
- How much credibility should be assigned to CCP threats regarding Pelosi's potential visit?
- If it is decided that Pelosi should visit Taiwan, how should such a visit be conducted? Are there any particular steps that might be taken in order to limit the likelihood of a contingency?
- What are the conditions under which the United States would come to the military defense of Taiwan? How can the U.S. government clearly communicate



Characters

The characters listed below have been assembled to address whether or not Nancy Pelosi should visit Taiwan, as well as how such a visit ought to be conducted. Remember, the crisis staff will not necessarily be sticking to a historical script when deciding the direction of the committee--and neither should you. Use your portfolios well, tap into your creative side, and you'll be good to go!

Adam Schiff is a United States Representative from California (D-Calif.), who believes that the United States has an obligation to defend Taiwan. As the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Schiff is one of the primary overseers of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). This entails a significant degree of control over intelligence budgeting and program approval, the ability to conduct investigations and hearings regarding IC activities, as well as the authority to request reports on intelligence issues.

Adm. John C. Aquilino is the Commander of the United States Indo-

Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). All of his missions are assigned by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. When appointed to this position, Aquilino said his primary goal was to deter China from seizing Taiwan, and reassure strategic allies and partners that the United States is serious about opposing China's adventurist military agenda. He advised Pelosi against visiting Taiwan in August, citing concerns about the likelihood of Chinese military retaliation.

Antony Blinken is the Secretary of State of the United States. Blinken has supported Pelosi's ability to decide for herself whether or not a trip to Taiwan should occur. He has also made several public statements reaffirming the United States' commitment to peacefully maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

Bill Burns directs the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA is one of many agencies responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information related to national security. While it is not necessarily Burns' job to provide policy



advice, he has expressed that according to the available information on China, CCP threats of retaliation ought not be dismissed.

Bob Menendez (D-NJ) serves as the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This means he is deeply involved in the process of deliberating international treaties submitted by the executive branch. Menendez has expressed that the U.S. government should capitalize on the bipartisan support for Pelosi's visit, and shift U.S. foreign policy in a more decisive direction toward defending the island.

Gregory Meeks (D-NY) is the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Per their official mission statement, this body oversees all legislation pertaining to foreign assistance, national security, and foreign policy. Meeks shares Pelosi's position that Beijing must never be allowed to dictate U.S. foreign policy, and has even been invited to join her delegation to Taiwan.

Jake Sullivan is the National Security Advisor (NSA) of the United States. His

job is to inform the President of policy options regarding national security issues, but not necessarily create policies himself. Sullivan holds the belief that Pelosi is allowed to travel wherever she pleases, and that U.S. foreign policy towards Taiwan has not changed regardless of her decision.

Katherine Tai is the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this committee, her role is to consider the potential implications of a Taiwan visit— as well as China's response—on global commerce, and what steps might be taken in order to ensure that U.S. trade interests are protected.

Kurt Campbell is the Indo-Pacific Coordinator for the United States National Security Council (NSC). This makes him responsible for integrating foreign and domestic national security policy, specifically as it pertains to the Indo-Pacific region. Campbell has supported Pelosi's decision to go to Taiwan, and dismisses CCP threats as overreactions.

Lloyd Austin is the Secretary of Defense of the United States, meaning he is



responsible for providing the military forces necessary to protect the United States' national security. He has been providing Pelosi's office with security assessments of Taiwan and the surrounding environment, and would also be responsible for ensuring her personal security if she chooses to visit. Austin has publicly expressed concern regarding the PLA's increasing military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait.

Mark Warner (D-VA) serves as the Chairman of the Senate Select committee on Intelligence (SSCI). Like the HPSCI, the SSCI oversees U.S. intelligence conducting investigations, requesting reports, as well as setting budgets and approving programs. Warner has not only supported Pelosi's decision to travel to Taiwan, but also used the trip as an opportunity to promote closer ties with the island moving forward.

Mitch McConnell (R-KY) is the Minority Leader of the United States Senate. So far, McConnell has been highly successful at rallying Republican support for Pelosi's Taiwan visit. In the event of a contingency, however, the

GOP may not be so supportive of deepening the U.S.' defense commitments to the island.

Newt Gingrich is a former Speaker of the House, and the most recent holder of this title to travel to Taiwan. He has stated that China's threats of retaliation against Pelosi are not to be believed, and that he experienced similar backlash ahead of his visit in 1997. It will be up to the committee to decide, however, whether or not Gingrich's perspective is based on an outdated conception of China's power.

Nicholas Burns is the United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. It is his responsibility to clearly communicate U.S. intentions with Chinese officials, as well ensure that Beijing remains constantly engaged with Washington as the committee comes to a decision. This will enable the committee to identify opportunities for cooperation with China, and avoid a potential communication failure.

Rahm Emanuel serves as the United States Ambassador to Japan. His job in this committee will be to advocate for



the interests of U.S. (and Japanese) strategic allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific, all of whom will be significantly impacted if Pelosi chooses to visit Taiwan.

Glossary

Anti-Secession Law enacted in 2005, this law stipulates that the Chinese government may employ any means necessary (including non-peaceful means) if Taiwan ever threatens complete separation from the mainland.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the ruling political party in China since 1949.

Chen Shui-bian president of Taiwan from 2000-2008 (first member of the DPP to be elected to this position). Chen's stance on Taiwanese independence from the mainland was highly provocative, leading to Beijing's passage of the Anti-Secession Law (and his subsequent defeat by the KMT at the end of his term).

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Established in the 1980s, the DPP is one

of two primary political parties in Taiwan. Current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is a member of the DPP. DPP stances toward cross-strait relations vary from candidate to candidate, but generally fall more on the side of independence relative to the KMT (see below).

First Island Chain geographical region stretching from the southern tip of Japan, between Taiwan and the Philippines, along the northern coast of Malaysia and toward Vietnam (see map below). Aquatically, the First Island Chain encompasses the Sea of Japan, as well as the South and East China Seas. The area is the most consequential region for both the U.S.' and China's maritime interests. Without control over Taiwan, this line represents the extent to which the Chinese military can project power.

First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) war between China and Japan, which ended in the cession of Taiwan to Tokyo as a colony in 1895.

Hu Jintao was the fourth president (2003-2013) and former vice president



of the PRC. Nancy Pelosi personally confronted him while he was on a diplomatic visit to Washington in 2002, calling for him to acknowledge China's human rights abuses.

Jiang Zemin was the third president of China (1993-2003), and his time in office included the outbreak of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Kuomintang (KMT) This is an alternate spelling of Guomindang (国民党), which directly translates from Mandarin as "Nationalist Party." The KMT was the incumbent ruling party in China when the CCP won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and continues to exist as one of the two primary political parties in Taiwan today. The KMT is typically favored by the Chinese government over the DPP, because their general stance toward cross-strait relations is relatively moderate.

Lee Teng-hui president of Taiwan from 1988-2000, and member of the KMT. He is known for having presided over the island during the Third Taiwan Strait

Crisis, and also taking a controversial trip to Cornell University in 1995.

Ma Ying-Jeou president of Taiwan from 2008-2016, and member of the KMT. His time in power was defined by his moderate stance toward China, which dissatisfied much of the Taiwanese public.

People's Liberation Army (PLA) refers to the Chinese military.

People's Republic of China (PRC) term used to describe China following the rise of the CCP. This is most commonly used to refer to all territories except Taiwan, although the CCP claims otherwise.

Republic of China (ROC) official name of China before the CCP came to power in 1949, and the official name of Taiwan.

Second Island Chain encircles the Philippine Sea, from Eastern Japan to Guam to Indonesia. This is the United States' second line of defense in the Western Pacific.



Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996)

this marked an intense period of PLA military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, in advance of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's potential re-election.

Tiananmen Square massacre (1989)

following the death of a reformist CCP official, students gathered in Tiananmen Square to peacefully protest the regime (specifically advocating for more political openness). The Chinese government violently repressed these demonstrations.

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed in 1979, this doctrine governs U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan.

Tsai Ing-wen sitting president of Taiwan, and member of the DPP.

Xi Jinping has been the sitting President of China. His reign has been defined by exceptional ambition and aggression when it comes to achieving China's strategic goals, leading to the coining of the term "wolf-warrior diplomacy." Xi is especially passionate about expediting China's reunification with Taiwan.

Timeline of Events

1689 → Han Chinese government lays its first claims to the island of Taiwan

1885 → Taiwan is recognized as a Chinese province

1894 → First Sino-Japanese War begins

1895 → First Sino-Japanese War ends, China cedes Taiwan to Japan as a colony

1927 → Chinese Civil War begins

1945 → Japan is defeated by the Allied Powers in World War II, leading to the return of Taiwan to China

1949 → Chinese Civil War ends, with the Chinese Communist Party establishing the People's Republic of China and the Kuomintang fleeing to Taiwan

1954-1958 → First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises



1978 → China transitions to a market economy system, and enters the global economy

1979 → United States enacts the Taiwan Relations Act

1986 → Democratic Progressive Party established in Taiwan, opening the door for democracy

1988 → Lee Teng-hui (KMT) elected as President of Taiwan

1989 → Tiananmen Square protests are brutally repressed by the Chinese government

1991 → Lee Teng-hui revokes Taiwan's acknowledgement of the Communist rebellion in China; Nancy Pelosi peacefully protests at the site of the Tiananmen Square massacre

1993 → Jiang Zemin replaces Deng Xiaoping as the President of China; Nancy Pelosi calls for the revocation of China's Most Favored Nation status in the World Trade Organization

1995 → Lee Teng-hui visits Cornell University, despite CCP warnings; the Taiwan Strait Crisis begins, weeks ahead of Lee's potential re-election for President of Taiwan

1996 → Third Taiwan Strait Crisis ends

1997 → Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich visits Taiwan

2000 → Chen Shui-bian (DPP) elected President of Taiwan, floats the idea of greater separation from the mainland

2001 → China enters the World Trade Organization

2002 → Speaker Pelosi calls for Hu Jintao to acknowledge human rights abuses in China, during his visit to Washington

2003 → Hu Jintao replaces Jiang Zemin as the President of China

2005 → Anti-Secession Law passed in China, in response to Chen Shui-bian's provocative approach to cross-strait relations



2006 → China's economic productivity rates begin to decline, after decades of steady growth

2008 → Ma Ying-Jeou (KMT) elected President of Taiwan, adopts a more moderate approach to cross-strait relations

2013 → Xi Jinping replaces Hu Jintao as President of China

2016 → Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) elected as the first female President of Taiwan

2021 → Joe Biden makes multiple public implications that the United States would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of a contingency, contradictory to the Taiwan Relations Act.

2022 → Nancy Pelosi announces her intent to lead a congressional delegation to Taiwan in August; China threatens retaliation, sparking a debate in the U.S. policy making community.

Resources for Delegates

Michael Beckley: "The End of China's Rise?" <https://www.michaelbeckley.org/institutionalinvestorkeynote>.

Center for Strategic and International Studies: "Speaker Pelosi's Taiwan Visit: Implications for the Indo-Pacific." <https://www.csis.org/analysis/speaker-pelosis-taiwan-visit-implications-indo-pacific>.

Council on Foreign Relations: "Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense." <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden#chapter-title-0-1>.

Wenxin Fan: "China Tolerated Visit to Taiwan 25 Years Ago. It Now Sees That As a Mistake." <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-visit-china-us-tensions/card/%5B%E2%80%A6%5D5-years-ago-it-now-sees-that-as-a-mistake-VNK7ek00P0Coch9JrB03>.

Zack Cooper: "The Fourth Taiwan Strait Slip-Up." <https://www.aei.org/foreign-a>



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****These resources provide a jumping off point for gaining more general knowledge about our committee topic. Most of these sites should be free, but please let me know if you have any difficulties accessing them as you conduct your research.*

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